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SUMMARY 
This paper aims to identify whether the European Council has respected the general 
principle of the rule of law during the actions taken during the Eurozone and refugee 
crises. The research is structured in three parts: first, a detailed overview of the 
intuitional formation of the European Council since its origins to the present day, with a 
closer look at the competences provided for by the Lisbon Treaty. Second, an analysis 
of the decision-making process of the European Council through the Eurozone and the 
refugee-management crisis, with more emphasis and detail dedicated to the second one, 
being far less researched that the first one.  
 
Using an inductive approach, the paper concludes that, while the European Council did  
overstep its Treaty mandate in the adoption of the EU-Turkey Statement, the larger 
result of the research is the identification of a problematic dynamic between the 
European Council and the rest of the institutions. In times of crisis the pressure of an 
agreement struck by the European Council forces other institutions to implement its 
decisions with a lesser degree of oversight of compliance with norms such as the rule of 
law and human rights protection. An important factor is the difficulty to discern a 
breach in the use of competences with the Court of Justice of the European Union 
taking a rather deferential position towards decisions made by the European Council. 
Without judicial review, the boundaries of action for the European Council remain 
ambiguous and open, contrary to what the Treaty of Lisbon had intended. Arising from 
this tolerated malpractice, a pattern of increase of executive authority in the European 
Union has been identified as representing a serious threat to the conception of the Union 
as presented by Article 2 TEU. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Treaty of Lisbon formalized the European Council (EUCO) as an institution of the 
European Union (EU) for the first time since its creation in the Paris Summit of 1974. 
Ever since that initial moment the European Council had existed in a sui generis form, 
with a special status within the legal order, being part of it while at the same time 
standing above it. With no accountability towards other bodies it resembled, as Armin 
von Bogdandy puts it, "the king in the constitutional regimes of the nineteenth 
century"
1
. The Treaty of Lisbon modified this supra-legal condition by including the 
European Council in Article 13(1), which establishes the institutions of the EU. 
Additionally, the competences that had carried out until that point were modified, as 
well as being bestowed a different array of new ones. An important change included the 
establishment of the President of the European Council as a semi-permanent position. 
This was done in order to ensure a greater continuity in the work of the institution, as 
well as improving its visibility both internally and externally.  
 
Coincidentally with the changes brought by Lisbon, the worst global economic crisis 
since the Great Depression was starting to make an impact in the financial system of the 
Union, bringing about unprecedented challenges and testing the ability of the EU to face 
in a coherent and effective manner a highly difficult and political salient situation. The 
European Council acted as the conductor of the management of the Eurozone crisis 
while raising questions about the legitimacy of EU actions, which included the 
introduction of harsh austerity measures and strict conditionality programs for countries 
that had incurred into large sovereign debts. Not completely out of the Eurozone crisis, 
instability in the Middle East and Africa pushed millions of people to make a dangerous 
journey towards Europe, seeking an improvement of their living conditions. The large 
amount of incoming refugees and migrants overwhelmed the administrations of several 
Mediterranean Member States, with some others choosing to accept as many as possible 
and others closing their terrestrial borders for the first time since the adoption of the 
                                                 
1
 Armin von Bogdandy, “Founding Principles”, in Principles of European Constitutional Law, ed. Armin 
von Bogdandy and Jurgen Bast, (Hart Publishing: 2011), p. 34. 
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Schengen system. In this instance once again it was the European Council the one 
institution to assume the position of crisis-manager, and in the same manner as in the 
Eurozone context several irregularities were identified in regards to the procedures 
established and the actions taken. 
 
This paper sets out to identify whether the European Council has respected the general 
principle of the rule of law during the actions taken during these crises. The relevance 
of the research question is marked by the importance that these consideration against the 
background of the European Union as a whole, for the European Council carries with it 
a strong but ambiguous power. The delicate institutional equilibrium of the EU as set 
out by the Lisbon Treaty acts as a system of checks and balances that has to be 
monitored closely in order to ensure the democratic legitimacy of the project, and more 
importantly, its continuity. As for the relevance of the paper within the academic 
literature on the topic, it is important to note that while the amount of research 
conducted on all aspects of the Eurozone crisis is almost overwhelming, that of the 
consequences of the role of the European Council during the refugee-crisis is almost 
non-existent. Additionally, this paper will support the argument that the crises of the 
past decade have curtailed the objectives that the Lisbon Treaty set out to achieve, 
specifically to ensure that the European Council would be subject to review by the 
Court, establishing instead a disquieting development of executive dominance of the 
EU's framework. The research will be structured in three parts: first, a detailed overview 
of the intuitional formation of the European Council since its origins to the present day, 
with a closer look at the competences provided for by the Lisbon Treaty. Second, an 
analysis of the decision-making process of the European Council through the Eurozone 
and the refugee-management crisis, with more emphasis and detail dedicated to the 
second one, being far less researched that the first one. Lastly, through an inductive 
process the conclusions as they stem from the previous analysis will be defined, 
together with an assessment of its implications for the European Union.  
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METHODOLOGY 
The research question that this paper aims to answer is whether the European Council 
acted during the Eurozone and refugee crises in respect of the rule of law, a general 
principle of EU law by virtue of Article 2 TEU. While that is the specific objective of 
the thesis, there is a more general one, which aims to assess the overall relationship 
between the European Council and the rule of law. This stems from the fact that the 
Treaty of Lisbon has for the first time introduced the institution within the boundaries of 
primary law, as well as making it subject to review by the Court. Being historically an 
inherently ‘flexible’ institution, the relationship between the European Council and its 
new duties warrant a detailed analysis.  
 
This paper takes an inductive approach to assess that relationship critically. First, the 
main body of the paper moves chronologically through the development of the 
European Council over its history While often times papers include a brief historical 
overview in order to establish the context of the topic to be reviewed, in this instance 
the relevance is greater and thus the length justified. Several arguments of the paper will 
take into consideration the pre–Lisbon institutional framework, therefore the historical 
analysis is needed. A critical analysis will accompany the description of the events as 
they occurred, trying to clarify the legal sources for actions taken and the problematics 
that arise in the way. Secondly, the paper then focuses on the Eurozone and refugee 
crises, while describing and analysing the actions taken by the European Council. The 
reasoning behind this approach is to acquire a clear conception of the institutional 
characteristics of the European Council that stem from the way its contemplated in the 
treaties and then contrast the law with the actual practice. 
 
After the analysis, following the inductive approach, the paper will outline a synthesis 
of the key aspects of the relationship between the European Council and the rule of law, 
identifying several issues that arise from the complicated dynamics between the two. In 
order to first establish the groundwork of the paper, the conception of the rule of law 
used in it will be laid out next. 
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The Rule of Law 
 
The legal order of the European Union is regulated in two ways: firstly, by procedural 
norms in regards to the competences that its bodies have, as well as the limits of those 
competences
2
. Secondly, by a series of ‘substantive standards’ that set out a series of 
norms, which in the case of the European Union carry the weight of general principles 
of EU law. Those provisions apply both, and equally, to the Member States and to the 
institutions. Article 2 TEU is the cornerstone of the EU's system in regards to those 
substantive standards. It reads: 
 
“The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, 
democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights […]”  
 
While in national constitutions these type of elements provide for ‘aspirational 
provisions’3 or ‘fundamental ethical convictions’4 that do not implicitly carry a formal 
obligation, in the case of the European Union the values that are stated in Article 2 TEU 
are not just idealistic notions with no legal relevance, or strength
5
. Quite the contrary, 
they represent not only general principles of EU law, but also ‘the very foundation of 
the EU legal order’6. Among those constitutional precepts one of the most relevant for 
the present analysis is the rule of law, one of its key tenets being ‘the idea of bounded 
government restrained by law from acting outside its powers’7. The principle can be 
divided into two dimensions, one negative and one positive, where the former provides 
that decisions adopted by any of the Union’s bodies has to be fully in line with primary 
law, as well as constituting an ‘absolute’ dimension, i.e. there are no exceptions to the 
rule.
8
  
                                                 
2
Timothy Moorhead, “The Values of the European Union Legal Order: Constitutional 
Perspectives”, European Journal of Law Reform, 16 (1), (2014). p. 4. 
3
 Dimitry Kochenov, “The Acquis and Its Principles: The Enforcement of the ‘Law’ versus the 
Enforcement of ‘Values’ in the European Union,” in The Enforcement of EU Law and Values, eds. D. 
Kochenov and A. Jakab. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016): p. 10. 
4
 von Bogdandy, “Founding Principles”, p. 22. 
5
 The Values of the European Union Legal Order, p. 4. 
6
 Kochenov, “The Acquis and its Principles”, p. 2. 
7
 Ester Herlin-Karnell, “Constitutional Principles in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice”, in EU 
Security and Justice Law: After Lisbon and Stockholm, eds. Diego Acosta Arcarazo, Cian C Murphy, 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2014), p.   
8
 supra at n., “Founding Principles”, p. 34. 
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Given the ambiguity as to the definition of the concept, the approach taken in this paper 
is that of a formal understanding of the rule of law, as proposed by Joseph Raz. This 
conception includes two dimensions, one in regards the way in which actions by public 
authorities are taken and another one related to the ability of those decisions to guide 
behaviour
9
. The first one is defined as the concept of legality,
10
 understanding which 
simply posits that for a measure to comply with the principle of the rule of law it has to 
be legal, i.e. it has to be in respect with the norms that are higher in the system. The 
second element of the formal conception includes that a decision has to be, inter alia, 
open and clear. This approach is in line with the one present in the EU legal order, 
interpretation that stems from the differentiation in Article 2 TEU of the rule of law 
from the other values included in it, namely respect for human dignity and human 
rights, freedom, democracy and equality.
11
 
CHAPTER I: INSTITUTIONAL SET-UP OF THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL FROM 
PARIS TO LISBON  
“The creation of the European Council is the most important decision 
for Europe since the Treaty of Rome” 
Jean Monnet 
In order to understand the changes the European Council has gone after the entry into 
force of the Treaty of Lisbon, its current position within the institutional dynamics of 
the Union and its role in decision-making, it is important to analyze the way in which it 
has been included in the relevant legal texts. This overview will establish the 
groundwork of the paper and will ultimately provide an insight into the reasons for the 
behavior of EUCO in the crises of the past decade. The chapter will be structured in 
three parts, the first one will provide the initial wordings by which the European 
Council was ever mentioned within the Communities framework by looking at the 
period from the months leading up to the Paris Summit of 1974 to the signing of the 
Single European Act in 1986. The second one will look at the impact of, and changes 
                                                 
9
 Paul Craig, Formal and Substantive Conceptions of the Rule of Law: An Analytical Framework, Public 
Law, Autumn, (1997): p. 468. 
10
 Gerard Conway, The Limits of Legal Reasoning and the European Court of Justice (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 91. 
11
 Armin von Bogdandy and Michael Ioannidis, 'Systemic Deficiency in the Rule of Law: What it is, 
What Has Been Done, What Can Be Done', Common Market Law Review 51, Issue 1, (2014):  pp. 62–63. 
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brought about by the Maastricht Treaty and its amendments of Amsterdam and Nice. 
Lastly, the Lisbon Treaty will be addressed in detail, laying out the competences that it 
grants the European Council and the positions that it establishes for it within the balance 
of the Union.  
 
The study of the present of the European Council warrants a historical overview more 
than a similar study of any other institution of the European Union, due to the particular 
nature of the development of the EUCO. Unlike other bodies, the European Council has 
always had a similar role and position on the architecture of the Union, what has 
changed over time has been the way in which that role has been included in the primary 
law. The legal ambiguity that characterizes the European Council is an inherent element 
of its ethos and sets it apart from other institutions. This is the reason why the following 
chapter is not an unnecessary re-statement of things known, but rather the 
contextualization of a personality that the European Council has had ever since the Paris 
Summit of 1974, where it was first introduced. The institutional characteristics have 
been largely constant over time, and it certainly can be observed in the present-day 
EUCO. 
 
1.1. The early stage. From Paris to Luxembourg 
 
The need for including officially meetings of Head of State in the context of European 
integration was contemplated since the early beginnings of the project, at first being met 
with opposed perspectives as to its necessity, added value and potential - positive or 
negative - impact
12
. On one side Charles de Gaulle defended the need for national 
executives to be the most important actors in a political union, since they were ‘the only 
entities with the right to give orders and the power to be obeyed’13. This was opposed 
by other member states such as the Netherlands, who did not want to make any 
profound changes until the UK joined as well as Germany, who had supranational 
                                                 
12
 Paul Craig, “Institutions, Power and Institutional Balance”, in The Evolution of EU Law, eds. Paul 
Craig and Gráinne de Búrca (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 45. 
13
 Anthony F. Imbrogno, “The Founding of the European Council: Economic Reform and the Mechanism 
of Continuous Negotiation”,  Journal of European Integration, Vol. 38, Issue 6, (2016): p. 721. 
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entities - NATO and the EEC - as ‘supervisors’ of its own executive and thus did not 
prefer to further a more intergovernmental approach
14
.  
 
These differences, the concomitant debate between supranationalism and 
intergovernmentalism as well as the debate whether cooperation should be economic or 
political, together with the existence of a big and small member states ran through the 
Bonn declaration, the Fouchet Plans and overall through the entirety of this early period 
of integration.
15
 Feelings towards institutionalized summitry on the capitals fluctuated 
between the 60s and early 70s all the way from disillusionment, such as in the ‘empty 
chair crisis’ and the summits in 1972 in Paris and 1973 in Copenhagen16, to enthusiasm, 
such as in the Hague summit of 1969 and the Paris summit of 1974
17
. This is illustrative 
of the myriad of possibilities and possible paths that integration could take at that point, 
every actor moving in terra incognita, since there were no historical precedents to it. It 
is worth noting that this ‘state of mind’ is not something unique to the 60s and 70s, and 
has in fact been, and is, a constant in the history of the Union. The best example of this 
notion is the decision in 2015 of the United Kingdom to abandon the project entirely. 
Taking this permanent imbalance in consideration it becomes clear where the necessity 
of meetings of Heads of State comes from, and De Gaulle’s words were certainly not 
too far off. Member states ultimately decided that the guidance of the premiers had to be 
institutionalized as part of the Community architecture.
18
 This happened in the Paris 
Summit of 1974.  
 
In spite of the differences in opinion, one notion was common: there was a need to 
better structure the Community if it was to survive. The Council of Ministers was too 
fragmented and lacked general coherence while at the same time, neither the Council 
nor the Commission were acting as leaders within the EEC, and thus there was an 
additional lack of general direction. One element of a potential solution to this problem 
was put into words by the French presidency, in particular by Giscard d’Estaing, who 
                                                 
14
 Imbrogno, “The Founding of the European Council, p. 722. 
15
 Ibid, p. 723. 
16
 Damian Chalmers and Adam Tomkins, European Union Public Law, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012), p.14. 
17
 Ibid, p.15 
18
 Craig, “Institutions, Power and Institutional Balance”, p. 50. 
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proposed the inclusion of the European Council as part of the Community
19
. In order to 
appease the governments that saw it as an intergovernmental take-over, d’Estaing 
phrased the new institution as ‘a complement, not an alternative, to the existing EEC 
mechanisms’20. Moreover, the new addition was not seen as a crucial new element that 
would mark a new beginning of stability and prosperity in terms of the structure and 
workings of the EEC.
21
 Together with this, it was also believed that what was written 
down would have as much impact as the subsequent practice of the meetings.
22
  
 
Here, the personality of the European Council is starting to be built, and becoming 
visible, i.e. an institution that relies in the ‘natural’ development of its own method, not 
observing too closely what is written if that is not felt fitting for the specific moment in 
time. This flexibility, or rather the self-perception its flexibility, is telling of a EU body 
that has always been aware of the gravitas of its status. The very way in which the 
European Council came to be attests to this sui generis quality, being introduced by a 
communiqué, an uncodified and non-binding decision.23 The special characteristics of 
the EUCO, namely the fact that it was the meeting of the Heads of State and the 
freedom of action that it enjoyed progressively proved to be highly relevant for the 
working of the Union and ultimately established that the institution was an integral part 
of the EEC. Over the years following the Paris Summit the European Council, 
positioned itself as the key body in terms of providing a highly valuable forum of 
discussion for the Heads of State. 
 
The transition from Paris to the SEA was marked by the progression of early 
development to a more ‘mature’ institution. The first years after the 1974 Summit had a 
more markedly informal quality, as well as an overarching one
24
. The European Council 
did not restrict itself to including matters in the agenda that were part of the treaties, and 
it frequently discussed topics directly outside of the framework of the Communities, 
                                                 
19
 Emmanuel Mourlon-Druol, “Filling the EEC leadership vacuum? The creation of the European Council 
in 1974”, Cold War History, Volume 10, Issue 3 (2010): p. 3 
20
 Ibid. 
21
 Ibid, p. 330. 
22
 Ibid. 
23
 Emmanuel Mourlon-Druol, “Steering Europe: Explaining the Rise of the European Council 1975-
1986”, Contemporary European History, Vol. 25, Issue 3, (2016): p. 410. 
24
 Ibid, p. 413. 
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aspect that was referred to as 'political cooperation'.
25
 As it becomes clear over the 
development of the institution, the European Council is a forum that was seen as useful 
in its quality as a ‘fireside chat’26, which provided ‘a forum as informal and private, but 
at the same time as high-ranking, as possible”.27 The value of the EUCO was its ability 
to touch upon any potential issue that may be of concern generally to the Heads of State, 
and thus to the Union, possessing a ‘hybrid nature’ where it tackles equally Community 
as well as non-Community matters.
28
  
 
The fact that a wide variety of topics were discussed among the highest members of the 
executives does not mean that it was producing concrete plans of action or specific 
decisions to be implemented later, on the contrary, often times the European Council 
meetings did not result in them, nor in policy guidelines
29
, highlighting once again how 
it was mostly relevant as a forum of discussion among Heads of State. Progressively, 
after a series of documents in the late 70s and early 80s, namely the London declaration 
of 1977, where it adopted its rules of procedure, and the 1981 London Report on the 
role of the institution in European Political Cooperation, the European Council gained 
formality, i.e. it was not just a ‘fireside chat’ anymore, but an important actor with the - 
increasingly - key role of ‘orientation and arbitration’30. This evolution culminates with 
the Single European Act of 1987, where the European Council was for the first time 
included in the primary law of the Communities as well as in EPC, with its introduction 
in that Treaty31. 
 
Article 2 
The European Council shall bring together the Heads of State or of 
Government of the Member States and the President of the Commission of 
the European Communities. They shall be assisted by the Ministers for 
Foreign Affairs and by a Member of the Commission. 
 
                                                 
25
 Emmanuel Mourlon-Druol, “Steering Europe”, p. 415. 
26
 Philipp Dann, “The Political Institutions”, in “Principles of European Constitutional Law”, p. 262. 
27
 Ibid. 
28
 Supra at n. 25, p. 415. 
29
 Ibid, p. 414 - 415. 
30
 Ibid, p.418. 
31
 Chalmers and Tomkins, “European Union Public Law”, p. 19. 
13 
 
The European Council shall meet at least twice a year. 
 
Even though the SEA itself does not define anything apart from acknowledging the 
existence of the body, the conjunction of the documents adopted up until that moment 
laying out different aspects about the characteristics of the EUCO, together with this 
formal recognition, established the ‘maturity’ of the institution. 
 
1.2. Maturity. Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice. 
 
The main impact of the Maastricht Treaty, signed in 1992, was the formal inclusion of a 
thick intergovernmental 'layer' in the European Union. Up until that moment the 
decision-making procedure was mainly the Community method. What changed in 1992 
is that now there was, within the Union, certain areas that belonged to the Community 
method and as a new addition, important areas which were under an intergovernmental 
method.
32
 This was a result of the need felt by the governments of the Member States of 
including specific aspects of national politics in the Community’s mandate. These areas 
included foreign policy and economic governance, among others. The transfer of these 
to Brussels did not incur the transfer to the Community method though. Governments 
were clear as to the fact that the change did not include a loss of sovereignty over some 
of the most delicate aspects of their activity, and thus a different way of making 
decisions within the Union was to be introduced with the Maastricht Treaty. This 
‘integration without supranationalisation’ 33  would set the tone for the following 
decades, forming a more serious Union that included an increasing amount of policy 
areas, signaling the need of transnational decision-making in a international arena that 
as becoming increasingly interconnected and complex. 
 
                                                 
32
Philippe de Schoutheete, “The European Council and the Community Method”, Notre Europe - Jacques 
Delors Institute Policy Papers, 56 (2012): p. 18.  
33
 Sergio Fabbrini and Uwe Puetter “Integration without supranationalisation: studying the lead roles of 
the European Council and the Council in post-Lisbon EU politics”, Journal of European Integration, 
Volume 38, Issue 5, (2016): pp. 482. 
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The Treaty of Maastricht introduced the pillar system, by which three different policy 
areas - with different decision-making mechanisms - were now part of the European 
Union. These were the competencies that the Union possessed up until that point in 
terms of the common market, agricultural policy (first pillar), and the newly introduced 
common foreign and security policy (second pillar) and justice and home affairs (third 
pillar). Within the Maastricht Treaty’s framework, the European Council acted as the 
‘federating power of the three pillars’.34 Additionally, the Treaty included an article 
laying out its general mandate under the new Union set-up, which contains the text 
present in the 1983 Stuttgart Solemn Declaration, and that overall represented the 
powers that the Heads of State had vested upon the institution through their practice 
over the years. The text reads: 
 
Article D 
The European Council shall provide the Union with the necessary impetus 
for its development and shall define the general political guidelines thereof. 
The European Council shall bring together the Heads of State or 
Government of the Member States and the President of the Commission. 
They shall be assisted by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Member 
States and by a Member of the Commission. The European Council shall 
meet at least twice a year, under the chairmanship of the Head of State or 
Government of the Member State which holds the Presidency of the Council. 
The European Council shall submit to the European Parliament a report after 
each of its meetings and a yearly written report on the progress achieved by 
the Union. 
 
As reflected by the text, the European Council was given a role indistinct from the one a 
formal institution would have. It is part of the Treaty, it is composed of representatives 
of Member States together with the President of the Commission and it has the mandate 
of providing ‘general political guidelines’. For an unofficial body of the Union, the 
responsibilities are anything but informal. This is illustrative of the overall identity of 
the European Council being ‘outside and above the EU legal system’35 and, similarly, to 
                                                 
34
 Emmanuel Mourlon-Druol, “Steering Europe”, p. 420. 
35
 Jorg Monar, “The European Union’s Institutional Balance of Power after the Treaty of Lisbon” in, The 
European Union after the Treaty of Lisbon:Visions of Leading Policy-makers, Academics and journalists, 
ed. Enrique Banús Irusta, (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2011): p. 67. 
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the intriguing absence of strict legal delimitations contrarily to every other aspect of the 
institutional framework of the EU. 
 
The European Council was given additionally competences with different institutional 
characteristics. On one hand, under the second and third pillars, the European Council 
was given a purely intergovernmental role, outside the Community method and the 
CJEU framework. Under the first pillar on the other hand, important decisions were to 
be made by the Council of the European Union, but in its highest possible composition - 
that of Heads of State and government. This reflects a middle ground agreement 
between the need to have heads of state making certain crucial decisions, but the 
emphasis of different actors - smaller member states, commission and EP - to keep them 
under the community method.
36
  
 
Overall, these elements introduced by the treaty of Maastricht were maintained through 
Amsterdam and Nice, and provide the architecture of the Union at the turn of the 
century. One of its main characteristics is what was referenced earlier, the fact that the 
capitals moved politically salient areas to the EU level, but did not provide the 
Commission nor the European Parliament a relevant role in them. In this ‘integration 
paradox’ the governments retained control through the European Council and the 
Council, although not in the classic interpretation of the intergovernmental mode of 
action - through pushing ‘a narrow defense of national interests’37 - rather cooperation 
was ‘deliberative and consensus-seeking’38. An important peculiarity that follows from 
status of the European Council up until this point is that it was ultimately a ‘protected 
institution’. It could not be brought to the Court because its decisions were never the 
final implementing decision, and being outside the formal framework the Court did not 
have jurisdiction over it. The dynamic was that there would always be an additional step 
on the lower level of the hierarchy by which the path set by the EUCO was 
operationalized. The institution would have been the Commission or the Council, 
including the Parliament if it is a procedure fell under the codecision procedure. That 
                                                 
36
 Wolfgang Wessels, “The Maastricht Treaty and the European Council: The History of an Institutional 
Evolution”, Journal of European Integration, Vol. 34, (2012): p. 763. 
37
 Ibid. 
38
 Ibid. 
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adopting institution would have been the one taken to the Court, and it would be its 
decision the one reviewed. The fundamental characteristic changed with the Treaty of 
Lisbon. 
 
1.3. The Treaty of Lisbon 
 
The Treaty of Lisbon is the instrument that brought the European Council the formal 
identity that it has today. Fundamentally, the change that Lisbon brought was that the 
European Union finally recognized the EUCO as a de jure institution, after almost 30 
years of being a de facto one. Together with the strategic guiding responsibility that it 
had ever since the Paris Summit, several new provisions were introduced, all of them 
with a strong systemic relevance, such as the ability of amending certain parts of the 
Treaties, changing voting or legislative procedures and appointing the High 
Representative.
39
 The European Council is the institution with the most power to 
change or shape the Union itself, unlike the other institutions, which have the power to 
change or shape what the Union’s output.  
 
An initial in-depth view into the competences granted to the European Council by the 
Lisbon Treaty will be carried out first. The aim of this thesis is to discern whether there 
is a pattern of changing institutional characteristics, and if so whether they go further 
than the treaties intended. Given the dangerous implications of the notion of potential 
increasing power by the European Council, the setting of the starting point is warranted. 
Only with a clear picture of what the primary law sets out it can be compared further 
ahead with current actions. It is important to note that it is difficult to differentiate what 
is part of the mandate and what is not, since the wording does leave ample room of 
interpretation, and can be used in different ways depending on the requirements of the 
specific situation. Thus, in a crisis the European Council would have the possibility of 
trying to extend its competence by way of a generous reading of the text, after all ever 
since the Paris Summit, the ‘implied political functions […] remain vague and 
ambiguous’.40 Nonetheless, the ‘generosity’ of that reading cannot be infinite, and there 
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are limits to it, limits that this paper will assess in Chapter IV. In this section only the 
Treaty of the European Union will be reviewed, since it contains the more relevant 
provisions for the purposes of the paper. 
 
The first time the European Council is mentioned in the TEU is in Article 7
41
, which 
provides for sanctions for breaches by Member States of the values present in Article 2 
TEU
42
. The role given to the European Council is that of determining whether there has 
been in fact a breach or not. That is arguably the most relevant part of the Article 7 
procedure, since it is the one that opens the door to the Council to adopt further 
decisions. Without the initial determination there is no procedure. With the first mention 
it is already clear what is the position of the EUCO in the framework: that of an 
authority situated above, not deciding on the specifics of any situation, but effectively 
orienting the direction that those specifics will take.  
 
Article 13 establishes the elements with greater relevance in regards the European 
Council in the Lisbon framework; Article 13(1) recognizes it as one of the seven 
European Union institutions while Article 13(2) includes a crucial control on 
discretionary action, stating: 
 
Each institution shall act within the limits of the powers conferred on it in 
the Treaties, and in conformity with the procedures, conditions and 
objectives set out in them. The institutions shall practice mutual sincere 
cooperation.  
 
This part also applies now to the European Council, who for the first time is explicitly 
included within a framework that sets boundaries of action; unlike the position it had 
held up until that point. A question arises as to why was it only in Lisbon that the 
European Council was legally recognized. The fact that it was not until Lisbon that the 
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European Council was included as an official institution of the Union does not mean 
that it had not had a role before that. As it follows from the previous analysis, quite on 
the contrary, the European Council carried an important function ever since it was 
created at the Paris Summit. That it remained outside is normally attributed to two 
reasons, the preference to keep the ‘high executive’ outside of the Treaty and thus not 
put any limits on its freedom
43
 (it could not be reviewed by the Court) and secondly, 
due to the strong intergovernmental identity of the EUCO, which different actors did 
not want officially included in the primary law
44
.  
 
With these notions in consideration, it is clear that the fact that the European Council 
was made official only in Lisbon does not mean it was only then that it started to have a 
relevant role in policy-making. A key aspect to stress here is that the Lisbon Treaty 
answered a call to bring down the Maastricht pillar structure, which had a large 
proportion of policy areas standing outside of the jurisdiction of the Court, thus in order 
to remedy the 'rule of law deficit' Lisbon made important changes in this regard.
45
 This 
was in line with the aims that originated the IGC for the Future of Europe, with the Nice 
European Council of 2000 addressing the need of bringing Europe ‘closer to the 
citizens’ by ensuring better democratic legitimacy and transparency. 46  Interestingly 
enough, the Constitutional Treaty did not include the expansion of the jurisdiction of the 
Court in order to include revision of European Council decisions, being only in the IGC 
for the Lisbon Treaty where this was included.
47
 By formalizing the European Council, 
the Treaty of Lisbon brought it under the scope of the Court, as well as the duties set out 
in Article 13(2). That is a total reconfiguration of the institution, and carries with it a 
completely different conception of it. The defining characteristic of the European 
Council within the Union's framework was its ambiguity, its capacity to act in a much 
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more unfettered way than the others. This paper puts forward the argument that bringing 
the European Council under Article 13(2) is the one of the most important additions of 
the Lisbon Treaty.  
 
Article 15 sets out the overall competences of the EUCO, stating in its first paragraph 
the main one, that it 'shall provide the Union with the necessary impetus for its 
development and shall define the general political directions and priorities thereof'. 
Paragraphs 2 to 5 establish different elements such as procedural rules and composition 
of the body, while 15(6) deals with the President of the European Council. Subsequent 
articles provide the European Council with relevant power in terms of shaping the 
composition of other institutions. This is the case of the European Parliament, the 
Commission, and the High Representative. These are followed by Title V relating to the 
Common Foreign Security Policy, in which the EUCO 'stands at the top'
48
. Together 
with the Council they are the only institutions with the ability to make decisions and 
take action. This sets CFSP apart from all other areas of Union policy and represents the 
uniqueness of the area. Complete intergovernmentalism, something de Gaulle would 
have been happy with.  
 
The final provisions of the TEU include Article 48, which sets out the different treaty-
amending mechanisms of the Union. In this regard the European Council enjoys a 
substantial position, having the possibility of amending through a simplified revision 
procedure 'all or part of the provisions of Part Three of the [TFEU]'. This decision has 
to be reached by unanimity and later approved by Member States according to their 
individual constitutional requirements.
49
 The last subparagraph of 48(6) establishes that 
amendments concluded under this procedure 'shall not increase the competences 
conferred on the Union in the Treaties'. This part is highly relevant, since whatever the 
aim of the amendment may be, the competences must remain the same, i.e., the EUCO 
cannot expand its powers by making use of Article 48. Read together with Article 13(2) 
it is clear that Lisbon envisioned clear boundaries for the European Council. That does 
not mean it does not acknowledge its importance and status as a sort of higher authority 
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- after all it was the Head of State the ones to draft it - but it nonetheless sets limits to 
that height. These limits were tested very early on, as the Eurozone crisis started to set 
in.  
 
CHAPTER II: THE EUROZONE CRISIS 
 
“The reform of Europe is not a march towards supra-nationality […] 
The crisis has pushed the heads of state and government to assume 
greater responsibility because ultimately they have the democratic 
legitimacy to take decisions […] The integration of Europe will go the 
intergovernmental way because Europe needs to make strategic 
political choices” 
Nicolas Sarkozy 
 
The weakness of the Stability and Growth Pact had not presented any real problems 
until the onset of the Eurozone crisis, mainly due to the fact that the economies of the 
Eurozone had not been under significant pressure since its adoption. After 2008 that 
changed and the reform of the framework was put on the agenda.  Two instruments 
belonging to that reform plan and the processes that lead to their adoption will be 
reviewed in this section, namely the European Stability Mechanism and the Treaty on 
Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union. An 
analysis into these two instances will establish whether, within the context of the 
management of the Eurocrisis, the European Council disregarded its Treaty 
competences and thus infringed the Rule of Law, contrarily to  its obligations stemming 
from Article 2 and 13 TEU. 
 
2.1 European Stability Mechanism 
 
In December 2010 the European Council issued a Decision by which, through the 
accelerated procedure established in Article 48 TEU, it amended Article 136 TFEU. 
That amendment would include a new paragraph that allows the Union to create the 
21 
 
European Stability Mechanism, which forms part of the elements considered to be 
needed to save the EU from the crisis. In October 2012 ESM was inaugurated, 
following the signature by the Member States of an intergovernmental treaty. It is worth 
noting that the amendment of the TFEU did not contemplate the Union creating the 
mechanism but that the Member States had the option of doing so if the circumstances 
required them to do so. The ESM represented the first economic governance body to be 
formed outside of the Union framework and thus inaugurated a trend that would 
continue with through the crisis, including the TSCG, which will be reviewed further 
ahead. 
 
The position of the powerful executives at the time of the Eurocrisis , namely that of 
Merkel’s Germany, Sarkozy’s France, Cameron’s UK and Berlusconi’s Italy is best 
reflected by the comments made by Angela Merkel in a speech in November 2012 when 
she stated that “the Lisbon Treaty has placed the institutional structure [of the EU] on a 
new foundation” by which she meant that Heads of State in the European Council had 
the authority to take the lead and be in charge of decision-making in specific, highly 
salient areas.
50
 The Heads of State decided on the amendment of the TFEU and 
subsequently concluded the ESM as an international treaty. Both these actions were 
within the legal framework of the Union since the EUCO is entitled to amend Title III 
of the TFEU by virtue of Article 48 TEU through the simplified revision procedure, and 
the Member States are allowed to enter into international treaties where the Union does 
not have exclusive competence. In the creation of the ESM the European Council acted 
unilaterally, and there was no role envisioned or granted to any other institution, apart 
from a consultation with the ECB
51
 ex ante. Within the structure of the ESM other 
institutions were provided with a role, namely monitoring and assessing responsibilities 
to the ECB and the Commission. The European Parliament was excluded completely 
throughout the whole process, including its absence of a role in the mechanism, even 
though this was not necessary and certain tasks could have been placed upon it.
52
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The ESM Treaty does not have an explicit provision establishing its obligation to 
comply with European Union law, except in terms of the Memoranda of 
Understanding
53
, including only a somewhat confusing preamble paragraph stating that 
‘[s]trict observance of the European Union framework […] should remain the first line 
of defence against confidence crises affecting the stability of the euro area”. That 
seemingly aloofness toward the EU legal order is present elsewhere in the ESM Treaty, 
namely with the fact it does introduce certain arrangements that do not match the 
general order of EU decision-making such as the voting mode within the ESM. Votes 
are allocated based on the number of shares each country has within the mechanism, 
with the result of the big countries having a quantifiably larger amount of votes than 
smaller states. This changes the philosophy behind normal QMV voting as it would be 
present in the Council for a logic of economic power, where Germany stands clearly on 
top, and importantly, small states stand with even less power. In fact, a qualified 
majority of 80% as laid out by the ESM treaty cannot be achieved if Germany votes 
against, since it has 27% of the voting rights.
54
 Essentially, Germany is the only state 
under the ESM regime to have a veto right, clearly affecting negatively the spatial 
constitutional balance of the EU
55
. The result from the ESM is that the European 
Council modifies the very essence of the EU by stepping outside of it by way of 
international law. Additionally, being outside of the Union’s framework, its activities 
are not subject to the provisions on accountability and transparency provided by the 
treaties.
56
 Therefore, while the process of amending the TFEU and singing the ESM 
treaty were, technically, within the legality of the EU’s order, effectively the European 
Council has amended EU law by way of using international law. 
 
2.2 The Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and 
Monetary Union 
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Following the adoption of the ESM, another international treaty was envisioned by the 
executives of the Member States in order to continue the strengthening of the Stability 
and Growth Pact framework. That next step was the Treaty on Stability, Coordination 
and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (TSCG), which presents another 
interesting instance of the role of the European Council during the Eurozone crisis. 
Three documents mark the process of the reform of the SGP, a ‘Euro Summit 
Statement’, an ‘Interim Report’ by the President of the European Council and a 
‘Statement by the Euro Area Heads of State or Government’. These documents were the 
ones that established the changes that the Pact would go through, with the final 
culmination of the international treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance - the 
reasons for it being an international treaty will be reviewed further below. Apart from 
the last one they were all adopted by informal set-ups, not mentioned in the Treaties, 
created by the European Council in the course of its Eurocrisis management. A closer 
look into them is warranted, in order to assess which kind of content do they include, 
what processes they envision and what idea of EU decision-making informs them. 
 
The first document was prepared during a meeting of the recently conceived Euro 
Summit, an informal group consisting of the Heads of State of the Eurozone countries, 
and was released as a ‘Summit Statement’ on the 26th of October 2011.  That Statement 
is relevant for various reasons, one of them being that it is the one that formalized the 
Euro Summit, by stating “we will thus meet regularly - at least twice a year- at our 
level, in Euro Summits, to provide strategic orientations on the economic and fiscal 
policies in the euro area”. A number of interesting details can be observed in the 
phrasing of the document, such as the use of the first person ‘we’ and ‘our’, instead of 
the usual way in which European Council conclusions are phrased, by using the name of 
the institution to refer to itself. There is certainly a perception of attempted ‘closeness’ 
or ‘informality’ which considering that comes from a group of Heads of State at the 
height of the Eurozone crisis is definitely a purposeful approach to stress the non-
official status of the configuration. Another aspect of the phrasing worth noting is the 
established mission of the new body, namely to ‘provide strategic orientations’, clearly 
echoing the Treaty mandate of the European Council which is in turn the only 
competence the Euro Summit can have a claim for. 
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In terms of the Stability and Growth Pact, the Statement was the first step into its 
reform for it mandates the President of the European Council, together with the 
President of the Commission and the President of the Eurogroup to ‘identify possible 
steps to reach [the strengthening of the economic union]’ while ‘in full respect of the 
prerogatives of the institutions’.57 The second document is the product of the Euro 
Summit commission, elaborated by Van Rompuy and dated 6 December 2011.
58
 In it 
the President of the European Council lays out two possible ways forward, both 
involving a combination of Treaty amendments and secondary legislation. That 
proposal follows closely the path envisioned by the German and French executives, the 
amendment of Article 126 is cited in a position paper of the German government that 
calls for upgrading the theoretical sanctions of the SGP to ‘real automatic sanctions’59. 
It is ironic since it was both Germany and France the first two countries to fail to meet 
the requirements of the SGP, although in that case the theoretical sanctions remained 
theoretical and were never applied.
60
 In a letter from Merkel and Sarkozy to Van 
Rompuy from the 5th of December, they restated that plan as the required one in order 
to improve the coordination of fiscal policies across the EMU and to build ‘on enhanced 
governance’.61 
 
This was the initial idea, however in the European Council that followed on the 9th of 
December the United Kingdom exercised its veto power to block the Treaty amendment 
process going forward. Following that development the European Council, in its 
conclusion of 9th of December, stated that ‘considering the absence of unanimity 
among the EU Member States, they decided to adopt them through an international 
agreement’. That agreement was adopted on the side of the 2012 January European 
Council meeting, and included the elements that were stated in the December Statement 
of the Euro Area Heads of State or Government. Although the executives of most 
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Member States had declared that they preferred the amending of the Treaty as the way 
forward, the UK veto changed the course to an intergovernmental treaty.
62
 Overall, the 
process started in the Euro Summit, and moved through the President of the European 
Council, to a European Council meeting finally ending the adoption of a treaty, the 
content of which was present in an earlier EUCO conclusion.  
 
The final result has been defended as being respectful, and compliant both with EU law 
and its institutional framework, Steve Peers even going as far as qualifying it as legally 
unnecessary and redundant, since it ‘largely restates obligations that already apply 
pursuant to EU law’.63 While the fact that the Treaty’s subject-matter may respect EU 
law, can the same be said about the way in which it was adopted? The signatory parties 
note their wish to make use of the enhanced cooperation provisions of the treaties and 
they recall that they are to ‘refrain from any measure which could jeopardise the 
attainment of the Union's objectives’, but was the procedure that led to the TSCG in line 
with the TEU and TFEU? This could be considered an example of output legitimacy, 
without an accompanying input one. That the provisions included in a 
intergovernmental treaty are in line with EU law does not necessarily imply that its 
signing followed it. Restating the provisions of Article 13 TEU, “the European Council 
shall provide the Union with the necessary impetus for its development and shall define 
the general political directions and priorities thereof. It shall not exercise legislative 
functions.” The negotiation of the strengthening of the SGP that has been outlined here 
cannot be considered ‘general’, since the work of the European Council has been highly 
detailed and specific, its conclusion of December 2011 being transposed into a treaty 
without much variations.  
 
2.3. The European Council during the Eurozone Crisis: Respecting its powers 
under the Treaty? 
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The conduct of the European Council during the Eurozone crisis was marked by the 
‘legal grey area’ in which it acted64. Among the elements the European Council used 
during the management of the crisis, there were soft law instruments to put forward 
specific policy directions, a step ahead of simply dictating strategy orientations. This is 
reflected in the Conclusions, such as the one from the meeting in March 2012, where it 
stated that in order to enhance the role of ‘peer pressure’ in Member States complying 
with economic governance rules, the European Council, inter alia, “invites the President 
of the European Council to promote regular monitoring by the European Council of 
progress achieved on key Single Market proposals in the various Council formations.”65 
This mode of policy making has resulted in a European Council very actively involved 
with Heads of State taking a position at the forefront of decision-making within the 
EMU framework.  
 
Conclusions are the currency of the European Council, they are its main instrument of 
action, through which they set out the strategic guidelines that the Union ought to 
follow. They normally focus on salient topics of EU policy such as economic 
governance, foreign policy and terrorism. They provide general provisions on potential 
action, leaving the details on legislation and implementation to the other institutions of 
the Union. In its conclusions the European Council ‘wishes’, ‘assesses’, ‘welcomes’, 
‘invites’. These are broad terms, used to guide policy, express the opinion of the Heads 
of State and communicate which topics are of importance in its view. Up to March 
2008, a few months before the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, and in an economic 
environment that was already being defined as ‘quickly deteriorating’ and in state of 
‘turmoil’, the European Council still ‘invited’ the ECOFIN to implement policy in the 
area.
66
 This contrasts with the Conclusion on the meeting of March 2011, when the 
European Council ‘adopted a comprehensive package of measures’. This reflects the 
way in which EUCO simply adapted the Conclusions to the necessities of the moment, 
                                                 
64
 Alicia Hinarejos, “Economic and Monetary Union”, in European Union Law, eds. Catherine Barnard 
and Steve Peers, (Oxford: Oxford University Press): p. 586. 
65
 European Council – Conclusions 1-2 March 2012. 
66
 European Council – Conclusions 13-14 March 2008. 
27 
 
expanding their scope to act as de facto legislation proposals, displacing the position of 
other institutions.
67
  
 
Desmond Dinan defends that “the European Council exists in part as a crisis 
management mechanism”, given that the Heads of State are the best positioned to deal 
with that type of situation.
68
 That may be a logical assumption since the Heads of State 
carry with them a strong mandate directly stemming from the Member States and it has 
always been a part of the “original raison d’être”69. The problem arises when a strategic 
role in dealing with a crisis evolves into a more specific decision-making mode, 
whereby the European Council leaves its position ‘above’ and takes on responsibilities 
initially vested upon other bodies of the EU.
70
  Importantly, the fact is that the Lisbon 
Treaty does not make any reference to the role of the European Council as a crisis-
manager, nor generally nor in any specific area. For instance, the TEU includes in the 
CFSP title an article regarding crisis management, where the Council is granted power 
to act accordingly if the need arises
71
, with the option of delegating to the Political and 
Security Committee “the political control and strategic direction of the crisis 
management operations” 72 . If a role in this kind of situation would have been 
envisioned for the EUCO it would have been within the CFSP, yet what is provided is 
an active involvement at the Council or more specifically at the Committee level. From 
this it also follows that, in the case of economic governance, if, the Lisbon Treaty would 
have contemplated the possibility of a large scale economic crisis, it would most likely 
have been ECOFIN the one to have the responsibility to handle it. No part of the text 
gives room to the interpretation that the European Council should rise to the occasion 
and take action. There are several misinterpretations of the Lisbon Treaty that must be 
rejected, for they establish an institutional framework that is simply not there. Specific 
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decision-making is not contemplated for the European Council, yet this was disregarded 
during the Eurozone crisis. 
 
Steven Peers defends there is nothing substantially new, but a Treaty amendment was 
argued as necessary, only being blocked by a veto. That did not stop the Eurozone 
leadership, which instead of going back to the table finalized an international treaty. It is 
doubtful whether executives would go through the process of considering a Treaty 
amendment when the objective is ‘legally unnecessary’73 . Bruno de Witte sees the 
desire of the German government to have to budgetary stability introduced in the 
Union’s legal order in a ‘solemn and more permanent’ manner as the reason behind the 
troublesome process of amendment.
74
 Additionally, other commentators have stated the 
European Council fixed some ‘leftovers’ from the Maastricht Treaty, where fiscal 
integration was rejected and the control of this area of policy was to remain with 
national governments
75
. If the European Council is ‘fixing’ the Maastricht Treaty and 
advancing the process of economic integration, it should be done through the 
appropriate channels, with publics having a say.  
 
Both Peers and de Witte offer compelling arguments as to why there is no need to see a 
wide network of shadow powers trying to exercise absolute power on the supranational 
elements of the Union, as well as on the European people. Nonetheless, the behavior 
shown by the members of the European Council is far from what should be expected in 
the EU’s legal order. In the course of the Eurozone crisis, the European Council 
assumed a more assertive position than usual. That assertiveness modified the 
institutional framework of the Union by displacing the Commission in its role as a 
legislation initiator, and to a lesser extent, the Council.
76
 Moreover, the inherent nature 
of the European Council as a forum where larger Member States carry a stronger 
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position relative to other institutions goes agains the political set-up of the Union, by 
leaving smaller states with a “voice without a choice”.77  
CHAPTER III: THE REFUGEE CRISIS 
Instability in the Middle East was heightened after the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, the 
Arab Spring and the subsequent conflicts that arose in its wake such as the Libyan and 
Syrian. Together with the overall troubled state of Sub-Saharan Africa with, among 
others, the civil wars in Somalia and South Sudan have provoked a steady flow of 
migrants and refugees to the European Union. In particular, Syrian and Afghani 
refugees started crossing into the EU en-masse during 2014 and 2015, overwhelming 
national administrations, as well as provoking an intense debate on whether Europe 
should accept them or close its borders. The refugee-management crisis threatened the 
basic consensus required for the Union to function. A difference of opinions along 
yes/no refugees dividing lines brought to light issues that the continent had just started 
to experience. After action at the Council and Commission level, the European Council 
increasingly became involved in strategic guidance and ultimately in taking specific 
actions in order to end the flow of people coming from Turkey by sticking a deal to 
avoid refugees from entering Greece through Anatolia. 
 
The role of the European Council in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice is 
halfway between the one it has in supranational areas of EU policy and the one it has in 
CFSP. This is due to the hybrid characteristics of the AFSJ after the Lisbon Treaty, 
where the third intergovernmental pillar of Maastricht was moved closer to the 
Community method, but still retaining some peculiarities from its original mode.
78
  
Article 68 TFEU states that the European Council is to set out “the strategic guidelines 
for legislative and operational planning within the [AFSJ]”. The wording is slightly 
different from the “general political directions and priorities” of Article 15 TEU and is 
understood to entail a more active role on the part of the EUCO in terms of agenda-
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setting. In practice, the Heads of State do not put much emphasis in  the normal course 
of events in this area of policy-making and only provides ‘political impetus’ in cases of 
a deadlock in the Council
79
. In times of crisis on the other hand, the European Council 
does come to the forefront and assumes a leadership position, this being its main role 
the institution has in AFSJ.
80
 
 
The following will be a detailed review of the steps that preceded the EU-Turkey 
Statement and in particular the role that the European Council played on it. The aim of 
this paper is to establish whether there is a pattern of activity where the EUCO is 
systematically overextending its Lisbon mandate and thus violating Article 13 TEU. 
Thus the refugee-management crisis provides for a useful case study in order to assess 
whether the prominent executive role that the European Council had during the 
Eurozone crisis, as shown by the previous section, continued in the same way. The 
analysis will serve to identify the dynamics of the existence of breaches of the Rule of 
Law. First, a timeline of the events since the increased tension from the beginning of 
2015 on, with a focus on the European Council activity during the time. Secondly, a 
review of institutional competences as present in the Lisbon Treaty and whether the 
EUCO acted within its mandate, or if instead it either expanded it or encroached on a 
different EU body with the relevant powers. This will be followed by an assessment of 
the instruments used by EUCO during the refugee-management crisis, with a particular 
emphasis on the press release used to inform about the EU-Turkey Statement. Lastly a 
general synthesis of the important notions raised by the analysis will be carried out. 
 
The focus of this section will be on the relationship between the European Council and 
Turkey almost exclusively. Over the period of time that will be reviewed a multiplicity 
of other areas of policy were touched upon by the EUCO, and more specifically in 
relation to the refugee crisis, similarly a varied amount of other topics were dealt with, 
among others, the relationship of the EU with the Western Balkans, or the steps to take 
in regards the Syrian Civil War. 
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3.1. The European Council through the refugee crisis. 
 
In April 2015 the European Council held an emergency meeting in order to address the 
at the time referred to as the ‘situation in the Mediterranean’. In that meeting a series of 
measures were approved, which were initially proposed by a joint Foreign and Home 
Affairs Council chaired by High Representative Mogherini, held three days earlier, with 
ministers of foreign affairs and interior agreeing on the way forward. Some of the 
decisions included the aim of disrupting trafficking networks by ‘swift action’ and 
cooperation between Member States and the relevant agencies, and the prevention of 
migration flows by enhanced support of northern African countries by way of CSDP 
mission present on the grounds, as well as cooperation with regional partners and 
bordering states, such as Turkey.
81
 Additionally, the European Council agreed on 
‘tripling the financial resources’ of Frontex Operations Triton and Poseidon, based on 
an initial proposal by the Council of ‘increasing the financial resources’82, reflecting an 
instance where it is the European Council the one to establish the final amount upon a 
proposal of the Council which is a technical reversion of their roles. Already here it is 
observable the dynamics at work when a crisis is present and the European Council 
takes its role as crisis manager. The treaties provide mere guidelines, with the EUCO 
being the one to chose its own power. 
 
In the scheduled meeting of June, the ‘emergency situation’ was first in the agenda and 
a series of  important decisions were adopted along three different dimensions, namely 
‘relocation/resettlement, return/readmission/reintegration and cooperation with 
countries of origin and transit’83. Firstly, the European Council agreed on a relocation 
scheme for 60000 people from Italy and Greece to other Member States, the ration of 
which to be decided at a Council by consensus. This is a specific example of the EUCO 
taking very concrete decisions, merely stating the Council to the ‘rapid adoption of a 
Decisions to this effect’. Additionally, the Conclusion states that high-level dialogues 
were to be initiated by the High Representative with origin and transit countries, 
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marking how at the beginning of the crisis the role of the High Representative is still 
recognized as being the main diplomat for the EU.  
 
In an informal meeting in September, the main focus was the now termed 
‘unprecedented migration and refugee crisis’. At this point the tensions between 
Member States have clearly become an issue in the process of managing the crisis. 
Donald Tusk in its intervention before the meeting stated ‘for many days I have tried to 
moderate discussions between Member States, but we have now reached a critical point 
where we need to end the cycle of mutual recriminations and misunderstandings’84, 
while the beginning of the official Statement mentions early on the need to work 
together ‘in a spirit of solidarity and responsibility’85. Apart from the general state of 
affairs in regards the divide between different perspectives as to how to tackle the issue 
of relocation, the Statement is in line to what should be expected of a European Council 
meeting. It states: “We ask the EU institutions and our Governments to work speedily 
on the Priority Actions proposed by the Commission. We want operational decisions on 
the most pressing issues before the October European Council, along the following 
orientations”86. Following that statement there is a list of guidelines that do not go into 
specific details, but are rather general in its approach. When it mentions the need to 
increase funding, it does so by mentioning the need to ‘enhance’, or a bit more 
specifically, to add ‘at least’ 1 billion euros. They are not specific amounts, but 
indicative amounts that the other institutions will later, through the procedures 
contemplated in the treaties, make the final decision and implement them.  
 
In October 2015 the Commission, ahead of the European Council meeting presented the 
‘EU-Turkey joint action plan’ (JAP), a soft law instrument that reflects the commitment 
of both parties to cooperate in order to improve the situation in regards to the crisis by 
“(a) by addressing the root causes leading to the massive influx of Syrians, (b) by 
supporting Syrians under temporary protection and their host communities in Turkey 
and (c) by strengthening cooperation to prevent irregular migration flows to the EU.” 
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The EU promises to provide Turkey with know-how and funding, as well as hinting at 
the improvement of its conditions for accession, in exchange of ensuring the protection 
of the refugees present in its territory and the enhancement of its efforts to the ‘fight 
against and dismantling of criminal networks’. Even though the JAP does not mention 
the compromise of the Union to further the accession talks, the document begins by 
referring to Turkey as ‘negotiating candidate country Turkey’, and the European 
Council Conclusion on the meeting of the same day (October 2015 Conclusion) remarks 
that ‘the accession process needs to be re-energized with a view to achieving progress in 
the negotiations’.87 The JAP also has a peculiar characteristic, namely as the fact that it 
is ‘agreed ad referenda’ without stating what are the timeframes for its conclusion or 
what details are to be finalized upon. The October  2015 Conclusion ‘welcomed’ the 
JAP, adding that ‘successful implementation will contribute’ to the accession process 
and that the progress will be assessed in the spring of 2016.
88
 In the informal meeting of  
the European Council in November, the only document produced was a brief ‘Press 
Remarks’ by Donald Tusk89. In it the President remarks the gravity of the situation with 
grave statements such as ‘the future of Schengen is at stake and time is running out’ and 
stating his position towards a more hard security approach on people coming into 
Europe, mentioning that ‘if a migrant does not cooperate, there must be consequences’. 
After those comments he stressed that the main focus of the meeting had been the 
negotiations with Turkey, but the following elaboration explains the process in a rather 
confusing way.  
 
Our main point of discussion however was on Turkey. President Juncker and Vice-
President Timmermans, who was just back from his meeting with the Turkish Prime 
Minister, gave us a detailed update on where negotiations with this important partner 
stand. We feel confident that a mutually beneficial relationship can be established that 
will help us confront the present crisis. 
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We all agreed that the EU side will do what it takes to achieve this while expecting the 
Turkish side to play its part.
90
 
 
What is confusing is that it is not clear what this refers to since there is no mention on 
what is there to achieve, or what is the part that Turkey has to play. Considering the 
importance of the moment, and the relevance of the person producing the press release, 
much more clarity is to be expected. It is worth noting that at this point it is still not 
entirely certain whether JAP has indeed been adopted between the parties and this 
document does not assist, if anything it does the exact opposite.  
 
At the end of November the Heads of State of the EU met with their Turkish 
counterpart, to discuss the crisis, producing a press release referred to as ‘EU-Turkey 
Statement’ (from now on ‘2015 Statement’). This is not the one that will be the main 
focus of this section, which was concluded in March 2016. The wording of the 
November Statement is what can be expected from this type of instrument, stating 
elements of common ground that are to be developed further, such as visa liberalization 
and the holding of frequent summits at different levels.
91
 Most importantly, point 7 of 
the statement reads: “Turkey and the EU have decided to activate the Joint Action 
Plan”. It is now that the required element to initiate it following the ‘ad referenda’ 
clause was the activation of the European Council. This modus operandi does not 
appear in any official or informal document, as far as the author is concerned. The 
requirement of the European Council formally ‘activating’ and informal agreement 
negotiated by the Commission with a third country is a new element, created at that 
juncture. Additionally, the Statement also states the commitment of the EU to provide 3 
billion euros
92
 in order to support humanitarian efforts in Turkey as part of a ‘Refugee 
Facility for Turkey’ (‘Facility’) set up by the Commission, which is the instrument by 
which the EU would operationalize its part of the JAP. Confusingly once again, this is 
stated in paragraph 6 of the Statement, i.e. the ‘activation’ of the JAP was mentioned 
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later than the set-up of the instrument that was part of the JAP itself. Why would that 
had been the order in which the Statement was set up is not clear, but it certainly 
contributes more to the feeling of disorder. Apart from that element, the Statement does  
not lay the ground of the agreement between the EU and Turkey, it is not the instrument 
by which the compromised of both parties are included. It states provisions in a general 
manner.  
 
The Conclusion of the December meeting of the European Council does not refer to 
‘orientations’ as the previous one did, but rather establishes a series of provisions that 
the institutions and Member States ‘must urgently’ conduct. The tone of the document 
reflects the gradual worsening of the crisis, despite the efforts from the EU to slow 
down the transit of people across the Mediterranean. In relation to the Turkey deal the 
document tasks COREPER to ‘rapidly conclude its work on how to mobilize the 3 
billion euro’ from the Facility.93 The Conclusion of the meeting in February 2016 of the 
European Council remarked that despite action taken in the area, ‘the flows of migrants 
arriving in Greece from Turkey remain much too high’ and further efforts have to be 
realized, on the side of Turkey, to implement its side of the JAP. A meeting of the 
Heads of State and the Turkish Prime Minister, as well as Donald Tusk and Jean Claude 
Juncker, took place on the 7th of March 2016, in between the February and March 
EUCO meetings, in order to discuss the state of affairs in the crisis.. The results of the 
discussions were made available through a press note released by the Secretariat of the 
Council, which included several key elements. One of them was the set of ‘additional 
proposals’ that Turkey had brought to the table in order to further limit the number of 
people crossing into the EU, noticeably the controversial prospect of returning ‘all new 
irregular migrants crossing from Turkey into the Greek islands with the costs covered 
by the EU’ 94 , as well as different steps towards accession negotiations and 
implementation of the JAP. The document follows by stating that it will be the 
President of the European Council the one to ‘take forward these proposals and work 
out the details with the Turkish side before the March European Council’.  This 
particular element will be reviewed in closer details in the following subsection. 
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3.2. 2016 EU-Turkey Statement 
 
The next European Council meeting took place on the 17th and 18th of March, in 
parallel to a separate meeting between the Heads of State of the EU and the Primer 
Minister of Turkey, together with the Presidents of the European Council and the 
Commission. That meeting resulted in an agreement referred to as the EU-Turkey 
Statement (‘2016 Statement’ - Full version included in the Annex) and it included the 
proposals that Turkey had put forward in the March 7th meeting, which were introduced 
in the document by stating that the parties  had ‘agreed on the following additional 
action points’. Following that statement a series of detailed provisions ensue, where the 
first provision reads ‘all new irregular migrants crossing from Turkey into Greek islands 
as from 20 March 2016 will be returned to Turkey’. Other provisions included are the 
further implementation of the JAP, continuation of visa-liberalization talks and the 
disbursement of the 3 billion euros from the Facility as well as the commitment to 
mobilize 3 billion euros more once the first ones have been used. The ‘freedom’ the 
European Council enjoys becomes clear when analyzing its decision-making 
procedures. Unfettered by legal constraints, it has the ability to act, negotiate and, while 
not formally, nevertheless bind the Union, since political agreements carry the 
responsibility of having to uphold them, with risks related fundamentally to the 
credibility of the EU in the international arena as an actor on its own right.  
 
Article 15(1) states clearly that the European Council ‘shall not exercise legislative 
functions’, provision that includes entering into legally binding agreements with third 
countries. To be sure, the EU-Turkey Statement is defended by the European Council to 
be non-binding, and thus it would not have been a problem had it been concluded by the 
EUCO. As it follows from case C-233/02 95 , “[t]he willingness to be bound by an 
agreement can be expressed in any form”, in this case a Press Release could also be 
considered an agreement in the legally binding sense. Interestingly, in the Vademecum 
on External Action of the EU, prepared by the Commission, there is a section aimed at 
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explaining the way an international non-binding agreement has to be drafted, in order to 
avoid it as being classified as binding.
96
 Among the necessary considerations it states 
that the text “must not contain any ‘Treaty-type’ language or clauses such as […] 
‘agree’”,  word that the EU-Turkey Statement does include when it states ‘[i]n order to 
achieve this goal, they have agreed as follows’97. This is not some twisted interpretation 
trying to find guilt where there is none, the text of the Statement is worded exactly in 
the way the EU’s own internal documentation explicitly mentions it should not. Another 
element that the Vademecum stresses is that “in any event, the intention of the 
signatories should be clarified by inserting a clause stating, for instance, that […] or that 
“this text does not intend to create rights or obligations under international law”.98 This 
type of statement is not included in the Press Release, supporting the notion that the 
instrument was intended to produce binding effects. Interestingly, it is in the European 
Council Conclusion of that weekend that include, in its paragraph 4 the phrase ‘The 
European Council reiterates that the EU-Turkey Statement does not establish any new 
commitments on Member States as far as relocation and resettlement are concerned”. 
Considering that the European Council later defended not to be part of the deal would 
mean that they are in fact an unrelated third party to the agreement, by which the 
provision is meaningless. Additionally, the clause is included in a separate document, 
not the agreement itself thus it has no relevance. The presence of the clause in the 
Conclusion, taking into consideration these notions is confusing, and supports the 
argument that legal certainty is far down in the list of priorities of the European 
Council. 
 
The negotiation and cooperation process with Turkey during the refugee-management 
crisis has proven one thing, the European Council has the ability to take a political 
space that, even though is not contemplated by the Treaty of Lisbon, it nevertheless 
exists and in certain situations is the only one that can offer the appropriate forum for 
foreign policy. The European Council does not have the power to enter into an 
international treaty on behalf of the European Union, condition enshrined in Article 
15(1), thus the European Council can only, if at all, enter into political agreements with 
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other states. The way in which the European Council has acted in the refugee-
management crisis carries problematic connotations, namely the fact that it is not bound 
by European law in the way other institutions are, mainly stemming from the how it 
understands its role within the framework of the Union. As the analysis has shown, the 
European Council has not experienced a change the decision-making process, it still 
acts with the freedom it had before being formally included in the Treaty of Lisbon. The 
problem that arises when striking political agreements with third countries is that, as the 
EU-Turkey Statement has shown, there is no careful consideration of the impact that the 
provisions included in it will have in terms of human rights protection, which is in itself 
a general principle of EU law.
99
 This issue has been dealt with by the Ombudsman of 
the EU precisely in this case, where several Spanish human rights organizations raised 
the claim that the Commission, while implementing the agreement, had not made the 
necessary assessment of its impact on human rights.
100
 
 
3.3 NF v European Council 
 
On the 28th of February 2017 the General Court ruled on the case of NF v European 
Council, T-192/16101. Remarkably, this is the first, and only, case of the Court of Justice 
of the European Union that has had the European Council directly as a party to the 
proceedings, and even more importantly, it did so as the defendant. The case was 
brought by a Pakistani national that applied for asylum in Greece in order to avoid being 
sent back to Turkey, the country through which he had arrived to the EU, pursuant to 
the provisions of the EU-Turkey Statement.
102
 The decision sought by the applicant was 
the annulment of the 2016 Statement
103
, based on the review procedure included in 
Article 263 TFEU, which in turn is available since after the Treaty of Lisbon, European 
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Council’s measures are also subject to it.104 The GC had before it the potential of ruling 
that the European Council had in fact been the one to conclude the agreement, even if it 
is titled as being from the Heads of State
105
, as well as ruling that even though through a 
press release, the agreement could have a binding nature and thus be considered a 
formal legal instrument under international law
106
. Here the GC was confronted with a 
decision that would shape the institutional framework of the Union, deciding whether 
the EUCO had acted ultra vires and thus leaning towards the positions of defending an 
interpretation of the Treaty of Lisbon that does not allow the institution to roam free or 
on the other hand, the confirmation that the EUCO was the crisis-manager per 
excellence of the EU and had certain leeway that would be respected if the situation 
required it. 
 
With those notions in consideration, it is clear the importance of the case and the 
responsibility the GC faced itself with. The only other time that the European Council 
was related to a case was in Pringle107, where the CJEU sat in full court, a configuration 
used that once in the past 12 years
108
, fact which serves to understand the contrast 
between the magnitude of the instance and the level at which it was being decided. 
Interestingly enough a motion from the EUCO to have a Grand Chamber following 
Article 28(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the GC was dismissed and instead the 
composition chosen was that of an extended one, with 5 judges seating
109
. Why would a 
Grand Chamber be deemed not necessary when the subject-matter concerns a decision 
of the relevance of the 2016 Statement made by non-other than the Heads of State 
seems odd, though the reasons for it are not stated, which is even odder. That was not 
the only instance of the apparent haste with which the GC moved through the ruling, 
paying little attention to key aspects of the situation in doing so ensuring the European 
Council was not subject to inquiry. The following passage provides a glimpse of the 
GC’s imprecise argumentation throughout the case:  
 
                                                 
104
 NF v European Council para. 43. 
105
 NF v European Council para. 45. 
106
 NF v European Council para. 42. 
107
 Judgment of the Court (Full Court) in Pringle, Case C‑370/12, ECLI:EU:C:2012:756. 
108
 The first one before Pringle was Commission of the European Communities v Édith Cresson, which 
ruled that the at the time Commissioner for Trade had abused her power in office. 
109
 NF v European Council paras. 15-18. 
40 
 
“It is therefore necessary to determine whether the use of [‘Members of the 
European Council’] implies, as the applicant submits, that the 
representatives of the Member States participated in the meeting of 
18 March 2016 in their capacity as members of the ‘European Council’ 
institution or that they participated in that meeting in their capacity as Heads 
of State or Government of the Member States of the European Union.”110  
 
What the GC is incidentally highlighting is the fact that there is already a formulation 
used in practice when there is the need to specify in what capacity are the members of 
an institution meeting.  When the Ministers of the Council meet in that capacity, not as 
in the Council, the formulation is precisely ‘representatives of the Governments of the 
Member States meeting in the Council’111. In the case of the European Council, as the 
GC itself mentions, it is ‘Heads of State or Government of the Member States of the 
European Union’, which is absent from the Statement. That way of identifying the 
capacity of parties to an agreement should have been the one used most importantly 
given the simple reason that Heads of Member States of the EU is not analogous to 
Members of the European Council. The European Council is composed by the Heads of 
State ‘together with’ the Presidents of both the EUCO and the Commission112, which 
were indeed present in the meeting with the Turkish Primer. This is completely 
disregarded by the GC, which defends the interpretation that Members of the European 
Council means Heads of State acting within that capacity based on, first, the fact that 
the EUCO in its reply had explained what it meant
113
 as well as stating that “[a]ccording 
to [the European Council], the term ‘EU’ must be understood in this journalistic context 
as referring to the Heads of State or Government of the Member States of the European 
Union”114. Basically the first part of the argument by the GC accepts the explanation 
given by the defendant in the case, taking a position of deference towards the European 
Council that is unwarranted and product of a decidedly lenient interpretation. 
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The second part of the argument follows from the GC concluding that the ambiguity of 
the terms used, and that therefore it is needed to look at the documents relating to the 
meeting from which the 2016 Statement arose.
115
 From this documents the GC argues it 
is clear that it was the Heads of State the ones to conclude the 2016 Statement since, 
among others, a note from the Council’s Directorate for Protocol and Meetings of the 
Directorate-General ‘Administration’ invited the participants to a ‘working session of 
the … Heads of State and Government and High Representative [of the European 
Union] with Prime Minister of Turkey’116. So in order to assess who is a party to the 
agreement preference is given to a protocolary note over the very agreement, which 
states something different. 
 
Additionally, the reason as to why Donald Tusk was present in the meeting is presented 
in the decision by stating that “the Heads of State or Government of the Member States 
of the European Union conferred upon [the President of the European Council] a task of 
representation and coordination of negotiations with the Republic of Turkey in their 
name”117. Thus Donald Tusk was there not as a Member of the European Council which 
concluded the agreement, but as the person charged with representing and coordinating. 
The issue is that, if that argument is taken as is presented, what can be observed is the 
President of the European Council representing the Heads of State of the Union and not 
the European Council itself, which is a  role that is not contemplated in Article 15 TEU. 
This is reminiscent of the Van Rompuy task force that was established during the 
Eurocrisis, and follows a very similar pattern. In a moment of crisis, the office of the 
President of the European Council is provided with an extensive mandate, one that goes 
beyond the Treaty and allows him or her to pursue a more active role, be it by internal 
or external brokering.  
 
Another argument supporting the fact that the GC took an overly lenient attitude in NF 
is the fact that, once ruled that it had not been the European Council but the Heads of 
State acting on their own right it did not review whether that was a possibility available 
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to them in light of EU law.118 The case-law on the exclusive right of the Union to enter 
into international agreements in specific cases is long and highly complex. In this case it 
is not only that they are of law is covered to a large extent by EU law, taking into 
consideration readmission agreements in general, but specifically with Turkey, where 
there was a previous Readmission Agreement (RA) in place. The JAP, which built on 
that RA was an instrument concluded by the Commission. This is not to convey that the 
Heads of State could not have struck the deal with Turkey, but the conclusion as to 
whether in this case they could establish such an agreement is not clear enough nor 
apparent, it was not acte claire, therefore the GC would have needed to review it. Far 
from doing so and offering a response on the matter, it was not touched upon in the 
ruling. That can hardly follow from the situation, if looked at legally, on the other hand 
if looked at politically, the same problematic that was presented in the previous section 
arises once again. When it is the Heads of State in a crisis situation, the case presents 
important issues. 
 
If the institutions of the EU do not have control over the agreement that ought to 
implement because breaking it when it has been concluded by the Heads of State of the 
Member States during times of crisis, and there is no prior assessment of the 
consequences of that deal in terms of, for example, human rights, then there is a flaw in 
the EU system of checks and balances. The need for action cannot be left unchecked, 
not when the negotiations impact so closely the lives of people. Automatically assigning 
Turkey, in a general way, the category of ‘safe-third country’ cannot be accepted as 
adequate. These are crucial times for the European Union, choosing whether it will 
stand for an effective system of protection of human rights, not only of its own citizens, 
but those that touch upon its shores is a delicate decision. Signing expedient deals with 
a problematic neighbor should not be a matter of a few days
119
, and they should not be 
signed in a ‘twice-removed’ way, first by using a press release as an instrument of 
policy-making and then by leaving the EU framework to act as Heads of State.    
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What has been analyzed thus far gives way to an unsettling realization. The Heads of 
State have moved themselves to a higher, third level of decision making, above the 
national and the EU one. They do not act as Heads of State in the classical sense, in an 
intergovernmental meeting or summit, but something different. The protocolary notes 
may have mentioned it, but that is not the way it was communicated to the public. What 
about the EU level? The Statement had all the signs of a European Council instrument, 
there was no explicit mention of the Heads of State anywhere in the text, it was named 
EU-Turkey Statement, the officials present where the ‘Members of the European 
Council’ which were all indeed at the venue, since both President of the European 
Council and President of the Commission were there. Lo and behold, it was not the 
European Council the one to conclude the agreement. The General Court decided it had 
been the Heads of State. The apparent attribution of the Press Release only due to the 
good intentions of making clear to the public that it had been the EU, they would not 
understand otherwise. The days after its announcement it was defended even by other 
institutions as a success of the EU.
120
 But it was not, the protocolary notes say. It was 
not, a Statement of the President of the European Council say. It was not even an 
international agreement, the March Conclusions say. Such is the unclarity surrounding 
the Statement that the General Court admitted that it could not order the applicant of NF 
v European Council to pay the costs, as is in normal practice, ‘in view of the 
circumstances of the present case, in particular the ambiguous wording’121. The Heads 
of State thus were in a level of decision-making above the European Council, in a realm 
where it is almost impossible to discern the true owner of the agreements being 
concluded. A thick curtain pulled in between the executive and the European people. 
 
Once again, there is an issue that has to be reckoned with, namely the fact that the 
European Council has not been granted the role of an executive power neither in crisis 
situations nor in the normal course of EU decision-making. The Lisbon Treaty states 
explicitly that its role is that of providing strategic guidelines both in general and in 
AFSJ in particular. So there cannot be a criticism based on the fact that the activity of 
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an executive power can act with certain freedom, which may be true for Heads of State 
within their own countries. But this power is not transposed to the Union, because there 
is no such provision in the treaties, which would be the way in which that would be 
enacted. The fact that a policy area is intergovernmental within the framework of the 
Union does not mean it is intergovernmental in its international law sense. Here it is 
important to make a differentiation between the two applicable dimensions of 
intergovernmentalism. The first one is contemplated in the treaties, it has been defined 
with a range of competences, an applicable voting mode and certain other procedurals 
provisions, i.e. it is the EU’s intergovernmentalism, which in this sense is the work of 
national governments, but always within, and never out, what is stated in the treaties. 
The second one on the other hand is intergovernmentalism in the international law 
sense, namely the aspect by which sovereign states are free to enter into agreements 
with other parties, retaining freedom to act within their executive powers as provided by 
their constitutions. As it can be observed the Heads of State tend to behave in the 
second sense of the term when a crisis situation hits the European Union. During the the 
course of the Eurozone crisis and the refugee-management crisis, including the 
conclusion of the EU-Turkey Statement, the European Council has behaved in a 
sovereign state logic. It simply acts, decides, dictates and asks to implement, with 
details.  
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CHAPTER IV: THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL AND THE RULE OF 
LAW 
 
“The imperatives of globalization render cooperation necessary, yet 
they exacerbate the injustices rendered by the failures and imbalances 
of integration”122 
 
The rule of law mainly establishes the obligated respect to a law that guides other laws, 
i.e. there is a primary text that is not available to the authority to change at will so when 
a public body acts, it must respect the norms and follow the procedures set out on that 
higher law
123
.  It follows that a mode where the European Council takes on the capacity 
to expand however slightly its competences goes against the precepts of the principle 
and so are not compliant with the rule of law as it stems from Article 2 TEU. The same 
applies for Heads of State acting on that capacity, since Member States do not have the 
capacity to change unilaterally the limits of their mandates.
124
 Next, two arguments will 
be presented as to the role of the European Council in the two crises tackled in the 
paper. First, there is an inherent problem tied to the nature of the European Council 
when it acts in times of crisis, coupled with the ambiguity of its mandate and the 
attitude of the Court towards the institution. Secondly, the adoption of the EU-Turkey 
Statement provides for a 'next-step' in the European Council's actions, going further 
than it had gone in earlier instances in actually taking an active position in decision-
making. 
 
4. 1. Pressure, Ambiguity and Silence 
 
What follows from looking in details at the decision-making of the European Council in 
times of crisis is that the position of the institution provides for a series of complex 
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problems. Firstly, the nature of the European Council is inherently one that carries an 
exceptional gravitas. Heads of State meeting in a delicate situation would have an 
important relevance, more so when there are decisions arising from those meetings. 
Two instances of this, of from each crisis, illustrate the argument well. In the case of the 
Eurozone crisis, the adoption of the ESM was a highly contentious action taken by the 
European Council, being subject of review by several national constitutional courts as 
well as the CJEU, sitting in its exceptional full court configuration. The reality remains 
that the ESM was introduced at a moment where there was a very real threat of a 
complete collapse of the European Union’s financial system. Even though the Against 
that context whether the European Council followed correctly its procedural provisions 
and its competences is bound to be subordinated to the wider implications of the 
decisions being taken. As Alicia Hinarejos put it, “while the ESM may not be perfect, 
few expected the CJEU to stand in the way of an emergency mechanism that had 
political support, and whose demise would likely have sent the euro area back into the 
acute phase of the crisis”. 125  Changing the name of the crisis for the refugee-
management one would maintain the relevance of the statement intact. 
 
When the European Council or the Heads of State enter into an agreement with a third 
country, the responsibility on reviewing its compliance with human rights will fall onto 
other institutions post-facto
126
. From the analysis of the previous chapter, it can be 
observed that in crisis situations and in a political context, the European Council has 
shown to put effective action above everything else. Even more considering that the 
threshold of protection may be much less in the case of the counterpart, such as Turkey, 
and thus the negotiation terms may overlook the levels expected by Union law. Paying 
lip service to these obligations by way of a sentence in a Conclusion
127
  does not 
constitute an appropriate assessment. Therefore, the agreement will be struck with 
effectiveness in consideration by which it follows that it will be the institutions that 
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implement that agreement the ones that will have to review it. This means that 
potentially, and agreement could be regarded to fail the protection mandated by the 
primary law only once it has already been made.  
 
The situation in that case is a conflict between an agreement done by no less than all the 
Heads of State of the Union and human rights provisions. For an institution, be it the 
Commission, the Court, the European Parliament or the Council the decision is clearly 
made difficult, since declaring an agreement as not meeting EU law would mean the 
need to not follow through with it. The EU would, after the deal is concluded, have to 
declare it inadmissible. The political implications of such a move are unimaginable, and 
it is hardly possible that the final decision would be to sacrifice a compromise made at 
the Head of State level, even more when it was made under the immense pressure of a 
crisis of the scale of the refugee-management one. This is an issue that is related with 
the particular characteristics of the European Council, not as they follow from the 
treaties, but as they follow from its practice and the way it has shaped its role within the 
framework of the Union. The General Court’s decision on the EU-Turkey Statement is  
also closely related to this problematic. 
 
Apart from the pressure put on other institutions to follow the lead of the European 
Council, an important element that makes a review of whether the EUCO is acting 
within the limits of its Treaty mandate is the ambiguity of that very mandate. The 
wording, coupled with a difficult situation, could provide for a wide variety of policy 
and decision making procedures. That is the case with most Treaty provision, and that is 
why the role of the Court is such a crucial one. The Court is the one in charge of 
defining the boundaries of powers, modes of action, attributed competences and a long 
list of other notions.
128
  
 
That being said, the problem in this case is the one outlined above: in times of crisis 
decisions taken by the European Council are a very delicate concept. Another aspect 
that can be observed from the analysis in the previous two chapters is that both reactions 
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to the crisis are marked by a highly confusing array of instruments, interlinked between 
them and often times difficult to understand. The spiderweb of measures in the Turkey 
negotiation is a clear case in point, for example with complete absence of procedural 
provisions for the Joint Action Program, which after what had seemed like its adoption 
by way of the Conclusion of the October 2015 meeting turned out it was not yet adopted 
- step that came with its ‘activation’ by the European Council months later. Steve Peers, 
referring to the measures taken during Eurozone management has stated that “they fail 
the test of transparency, because of their near-total complexity and unreadability, 
scattered across a dozen primary, secondary and soft-law sources”.129 The fact that the 
statement could be very well about the refugee-management crisis stresses the vacuum 
left by the Court in these types of instances. Even though there is a multiplicity of 
instruments being used and decisions being taken that warrant a definition of the 
boundaries within which they are adopted, its review carries a concomitant pressure.  
 
This judicial deference towards the European Council is apparent in a more marked 
manner in NF v European Council. Deference in this instance reflects ‘a reluctance to 
question’ in areas of a highly delicate nature, as the refugee-management in early 2016 
was indeed an instance of.
130
 The resulting ‘silence’ opens the way for a vacuum of 
power where ‘power is not given but is up for grabs’.131 Thus, with the absence of a 
review by the Court of the limitations set by Article 13(2) on the competences of the 
European Council it is impossible to assess whether the institution is acting formally 
within its mandate, and therefore whether it can be accused of breaching the principle of 
the rule of law as protected by Article 2 TEU. This is the case generally, where the 
European Council acts in the ‘grey area’ 132 , which almost always considering the 
undefinedness of the limits, but there can still be a determination of cases that are 
flagrantly outside of the scope established by Article 15 TEU. Examples of this were 
observed during the adoption of the EU-Turkey Statement, and will be addressed below. 
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4.2. Progressive Assertiveness 
 
Considering that the question of who really adopted the EU-Turkey Statement is highly 
difficult to answer, notwithstanding the resolution of the GC, it is worth looking at 
which factors would have been seen as breaches of Article 13(2) in both hypotheticals. 
This will provide the conclusion that whichever interpretation taken as to whether the 
European Council or the Heads of State alone concluded the agreement there would be 
an overstepping of competences highlighting that the fact that the European Council 
took a step further into assuming powers it does not official have. Precisely one of the 
pleas in law of the applicant in NF v European Council in support of the acceptance by 
the Court of the appeal brought against the decision of the GC is the European 
Council’s disregard for ‘the principles established by the Court in [Les Verts]’.133 
  
If it is accepted that the European Council was the one to do it, then the issues arise as 
to its ability to do it, since the treaties do not allow the institution to enter into 
agreements producing legal effects. If, at has been argued before, it is accepted that the 
agreement does establish a legal relationship between the parties, the answer is straight 
forward: The European Council does not have the ability to enter into such type of 
instrument, being preclude by its inability to ‘exercise legislative functions’ as Article 
15(1) dictates.  
 
Taking the second assumption, the negotiation of the EU-Turkey Statement saw a 
decision-making procedure by which the European Council atomized itself, the 
President of the European Council being mandated by Heads of State to prepare a future 
meeting of Heads of State where he would also be present, together with the President 
of the Commission. This hardly follows from the way in which the Treaty of Lisbon 
sets out the duties of the office, and claiming the need for action in order to address a 
difficult situation is simply not acceptable. That negotiations at the level of Heads of 
State may be necessary in certain instances is undoubted and this paper does not 
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proclaim in any way to qualify it as wrong, but the way in which the actors conducted 
themselves in this instance was unsettling from a legal perspective. The infringement in 
this case of primary law comes from, first, the ultra vires role of the President of the 
European Council preparing a meeting and a text that was not for a European Council 
meeting, taking the role of a Foreign Minister for all the Member States simultaneously, 
but still in a completely intergovernmental sense, which the office is not. The President 
of the European Council does not represent the Heads of State of the Member States, it 
represents the European Council, whatever the vagueness of the setting and the 
vagueness of the wording. Secondly, in the vein as an argument presented earlier in the 
paper, the competence of the Heads of State would not have been present since it is an 
exclusive competence of the Union, which has already regulated in the area, to enter 
into a subsequent agreement.  
 
What follows from this consideration is the fact that the European Council took a course 
of action that had, under no circumstances, a legal basis. This is an institution that will 
take action if the moment so requires, disregarding the strict hierarchy of EU law as to 
an unilateral extension of competences.
134
 An Ethereal Plane, away from the eyes of the 
Treaty of Lisbon. What follows is that whatever the position taken on who concluded 
the 2016 Statement, there would have been a wide disregard for the rule of law as a 
constitutional principle of the Union, indeed supporting Kochenov’s argument that in 
the legal framework of the Union the norm has not ‘acquired any self-standing 
value’135. In turn, a worrying assertiveness of the European Council illustrates the rise 
of executive authority in detriment of fundamental values such as the rule of law. 
 
4.3. The Rise of Executive Authority 
 
The Treaty of Lisbon formalized the European Council as an institution, it constrained it 
constitutionally by making it subject of Article 13(2), but it did not grant it the power to 
make legislative decisions and did not extend the competences that the Treaty of 
Maastricht had already vested upon it in any significant way. It did not include mentions 
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of crisis-management and did not envision an office of the President that could have a 
significant role in decision-making. While it can be defended, as Jorg Monar does, that 
there was a clear strengthening of the institution since the wording of its main function 
had been changed from providing the ‘general political guidelines’ to ‘general political 
directions and priorities’136, substantially that change did not change the nature of the 
duties of the European Council. It was still supposed to limit itself to thinking 
‘generally’.  
 
The drafting of the Lisbon Treaty happened at a point when the potentialities of the 
EUCO were understood, since it had a long history in which it had carried a similar 
power. What follows is that the Treaty of Lisbon acknowledged the European Council 
but there was no intention of making it a co-executive body with the Commission. The 
crucial impact that the two crises that followed 2008 has been that of shifting the 
constitutional understanding of the Union. By way of practice, or more precisely, by 
way of the need for action in difficult times opened the door to a framework where a 
self-confident institution could extend its power beyond the primary law. The European 
Council has done so through exercising more competences and utilizing a wider toolbox 
of instruments. That there was a need for action though does not justify that the 
European Council was the one to fill that requirement, since nowhere in the law that 
was reflected, to the contrary, what the law reflected is that this was no longer a Paris, 
or a Maastricht European Council with no accountability to the other institutions but 
one that did. The key element of Article 13 TEU is not its first paragraph, but its second 
one. The problem is that, as has been defended earlier in the paper, what has happened 
is that there has been a misinterpretation of the changes brought by Article 13 TEU to 
the role of the European Council, by focusing on its formalization as an adoubement 
and an indication that it had the capacity to act in a more decisive manner. The very 
European Council showed how that was the way it understood its new role when it 
appointed the first High Representative. The process requires the approval of the 
President of the Commission, but the press release announcing the designation of 
Catherine Ashton did not mention him
137
. That the European Council decided not to 
included that approval shows certain disrespect to the role that other institutions play in 
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the framework of the Union, as well as illustrating how Van Rompuy’s EUCO saw 
itself as a club of Heads of State in the most Gaullian sense. Tolerated malpractice, not 
constitutional provisions, shaped the European Council after Lisbon. 
 
It is important to stress the fact that this process has been tolerated. The other 
institutions have allowed, if not incentivized this development through their own 
practice. As James and Copeland argue, the European Council is the locus that the 
Commission and the Council turn to when there is a deadlock, producing what they 
term as ‘executive empowerment’.138 These deadlocks can be in agenda setting in the 
case of the Commission or in negotiation in the Council
139
 and the European Council 
provides for a venue where these issues can be dealt with and surpassed. An issues that 
arises from this practice, is that the solution to such a deadlock cannot be to move the 
problem to an institution that does not have the power to deal with it. If there are issues 
faced by the Council and the Commission, then those must be the settings where a way 
to move forward that is in respect of the treaties is found. The argument of the European 
Council as the only available ‘deal maker’ cannot be accepted because that role is not 
contemplated in the treaties, which in turn undermines the democratic foundations of 
the Union. The fact that the EU framework is shaped by the practice of its institutions, a 
process that at times ‘evolves beyond [the] formal constitutional frame’ 140  if the 
situation so requires, cannot be understood as providing a carte blanche to the EU 
bodies, whether while establishing policy guidelines or while making decisions. 
Institutional rules provide for a guide for action
141
 and as such should be respected, at 
least in their overall purpose, in the constitutional principles that lay behind them
142
. 
Merkel’s ‘new foundation’ is an euphemism for executive liberty that does not follow 
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from the Lisbon Treaty, it has to be described as a willful misinterpretation of both its 
aims  and the historical process that led to it.
143
 
 
Another point that Monar stresses is that particularly, in the area of AFSJ the European 
Council has been given such a major role that puts it ‘in a stronger position that the 
Commission regarding the Union’s legislative agenda’ 144 , but the truth is that the 
Commission in AFSJ has been granted a ever-larger role after Lisbon with the 
‘communitarization’ of Maastricht’s third pillar 145 . With that process equally 
importantly, the powers of both the European Parliament and the Council have been 
extended, and the jurisdiction of the Court now applies to the whole area.
146
 
Additionally, the Commission is the one vested with the mandate of representing the 
Union externally in this area. Yes, the European Council was set to have a more 
important part to play, but still within the ‘strategic guidelines’ and not further. For 
instance in the section dedicated to the decision making changes brought by the Lisbon 
Treaty to asylum and immigration law Helen Toner does not mention once the 
European Council.
147
 Steve Peers equally understood Article 68 TEU as rephrasing the 
role that the European Council had played until that moment and additionally, he saw 
the EUCO as ‘not playing a major role’ in operational matters given its ‘obvious lack 
[of] specialist knowledge’148. Fast forward to 2016 and what can be observed is a 
President of the European Council preparing meetings with third-country Premiers, 
striking agreements dealing with  very specific plans and actions in the areas of asylum 
and migration. 
 
The result of empowering an executive is an empowered executive which is not 
legitimized constitutionally. If the development of the Union has led to a slightly supra-
nationalized, but still Westphalian model where Heads of State bargain in an 
international law modus much like other classical international organizations then Van 
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Gend en Loos, as Ole Spiermann defended back in 1999
149
, had no relevance, there is 
no ‘new legal order’150. If transnational networks of governance are taken to reinforce 
the power of national executives
151
, the possibility that the Lisbon Treaty offered was 
that of establishing a firm transnational network that would strengthen, not the national 
executives, but a transnational legislature
152
. The most important aspect of the text was 
the unprecedented expansion of competences of the European Parliament, especially 
with the formalization of the codecision procedure as the default mode of policy-
making in the Union. The Lisbon Treaty called ‘ordinary’ the legislative process 
involving the European Parliament and made the European Council subject to review by 
the Court of Justice. Instead, reactions based on achieving results, rather than respecting 
values have transformed the reality of the Union.
153
  
 
Justifying this result-oriented mentality as inherent in the openness or fluidity of the 
Union’s policy process or its need for adaption is warranted, but so is addressing the 
definition of its limits. Its limits are to be found in the constitutional principles of the 
European Union, which provide the boundaries of the institutions, as well as the 
Member States, and stand above them, even above the European Council. That a legal 
framework put in place in a specific area, such as the Common European Asylum 
System, is not efficient when it is needed the most and acts as a ‘statutory corset’, not 
allowing adaption to fast-paced changes in times of crisis
154
 should not open the door to 
putting a blindfold over the EU’s primary law.  The label of ‘superior commander’ 
enshrined in the opinion that the Heads of State carry the ultimate legitimacy to act 
cannot be accepted as being superior to the constitutional principles of the EU, because 
doing so enhances a mode of governance heavily reliant on executive power, or as 
Joerges puts it echoing Hobbes, the EU is slipping into ‘Schmittianism’ through a 
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policy process that follows the maxim of ‘auctoritas, non veritas, facit legem’.155 A turn 
towards modes with authoritarian characteristics is a grim prospect in itself, but the 
crises have furthermore seen arise the existence of concomitant problems to it with the 
surge of Euroscepticism and populism, in a process that Christian Kreuder-Sonnen calls 
‘the authoritarian cycle’156. This cycle is defined by a dynamic in which undemocratic 
actions at the EU level are met with a heightened radical politicization of the domestic 
discourses in the Member States, as well as antagonizing ‘Brussels’ as the source of all 
the evils of the post-industrial era
157
. 
 
What has been termed as ‘post-democracy’ precisely points out to the subordination of 
national parliaments to transnational policy-making, where they simply carry out a 
formal function, but not a substantive one, which is taken to the international realm.
158
 
In terms of the European Union during the Eurozone and the refugee-management 
crises is a sort of post-post-democracy, where the executive has appropriated the powers 
that are constitutionally vested upon other institutions. Instead of buttressing the 
collaboration between the Commission, the Council and the European Parliament, the 
tendency has been towards accepting the European Council as a legitimate avenue for 
taking decisions. In this consideration the side-lining of the EP is crucial, given that 
Lisbon ‘upgraded’ it precisely to avoid EU action to be seen as devoid of public input, 
of the citizens’ voice, carrying with it an exacerbation of the authoritarian cycle. The 
diagnosis that Somek conducts of national parliaments, describing how they become 
passive actors that ‘do not take risks or leave toying with hazardous ideas […] to the 
parties on the ends of the political spectrum’ 159  can be transposed into the EU’s 
institutional framework, highlighting the potential negative consequences of tolerating 
the malpractice of the European Council. There is a responsibility on the part of the 
European bodies to reaffirm the main aims of the Lisbon Treaty, and revert to an 
interpretation of it that is more faithfully to what its intentions were.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
The paper set out to answer the question of whether the European Council has breached 
the general principle of the rule of law during its handling of the Eurozone and refugee 
crises. In order to so a critical analysis of the action taken by the institution during the 
developments of both instances has been carried out, within the wider context of the 
historical evolution of the European Council and the changes brought by the Treaty of 
Lisbon.  
 
It has been concluded that during the adoption of the EU-Turkey Statement the 
European Council did indeed overstep its Treaty mandate, whether it is considered that 
it was the European Council or the Heads of State the actual parties to the agreement. 
Additionally, an important conclusion of the paper is that the relationship between the 
European Council and the wider institutional framework of the Union during times of 
crisis is a problematic one due to the especial nature of the high profile of a meeting of 
the Heads of State. In this dynamic, the pressure of an agreement struck by the 
European Council forces other institutions to implement it with a lesser degree of 
oversight of compliance with norms such as the rule of law and human rights protection. 
An important factor is the difficulty to discern a breach in the use of competences with 
the Court of Justice of the European Union taking a rather deferential position towards 
decisions made by the European Council. Without judicial review, the boundaries of 
action for the European Council remain ambiguous and open, contrary to what the 
Treaty of Lisbon had intended.  Thus the result, as identified by the paper, is that the 
European Council retains the characteristics that had historically, that of a ‘king in the 
constitutional regimes of the nineteenth century’160. Arising from this problematics, a 
pattern of increase of executive authority in the European Union has been identified and 
presented as a serious issue that puts at risk the conception of the Union as presented by 
Article 2 TEU. 
 
 
                                                 
160
 Bogdandy, “Founding Principles”,  p. 34. 
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